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A central feature of Darwin’s theory of natural selection is that it explains the
purpose of biological adaptation. Here, I: emphasize the scientific impor-
tance of understanding what adaptations are for, in terms of facilitating
the derivation of empirically testable predictions; discuss the population
genetical basis for Darwin’s theory of the purpose of adaptation, with refer-
ence to Fisher’s ‘fundamental theorem of natural selection’; and show that a
deeper understanding of the purpose of adaptation is achieved in the context
of social evolution, with reference to inclusive fitness and superorganisms.1. The purpose of adaptation
Darwinism is a theory of the process of adaptation, i.e. the appearance of design
in the biological world. The problem of how to explain adaptation is an ancient
one, and it famously provided the basis for William Paley’s [1] argument for
the existence of an intelligent, divine designer. This problem was decisively
solved by Charles Darwin [2], whose theory of evolution by natural selec-
tion—in which heritable variations associated with greater survival and
reproductive success are identified as being more likely to accumulate in natural
populations—explained the adaptation of organisms in purely naturalistic,
mechanical terms.
Darwinism is also a theory of the purpose of adaptation, i.e. the design
objective of biological organisms. Darwin argued that, as a consequence of
natural selection preferentially retaining those heritable variations associated
with greater survival and reproductive success, organisms will appear as if
they are designed to maximize their survival and reproductive success—that
is, their Darwinian fitness.
Indeed, Darwinism is the only scientific theory of the purpose of adaptation.
While some continue to maintain that mystical forces—such as external, divine
interventions or internal, vitalistic drives—are responsible for adaptation, none
of these hypotheses yield clearly justified, testable predictions as to what the result-
ing adaptation is actually for (table 1). The question of purpose is often dodged, or
else a purpose is asserted without clear justification. Strangely, whereas one might
expect different drivers of adaptation to be associated with different design objec-
tives, those who dispute natural selection’s role in biological adaptation often
nevertheless regard organisms as striving to maximize their Darwinian fitness.
For example, anti-Darwinist James Shapiro [3, p. 137] views organisms as vitalistic
beings that inexplicably strive to maximize their ’survival, growth and reproduc-
tion’ for reasons that have nothing to do with the action of natural selection.
The idea of adaptive purpose does not imply that the design objective is
perfectly realized. Paley [1] emphasized that the hallmark of design is not per-
fection but rather that an organism’s or organ’s apparent purposiveness is
evident from its adaptive complexity, or ‘contrivance and relation of parts’.
Comparing organisms and their component parts to human artefacts like
pocket watches, he noted that even a broken watch manifests purposiveness
in its intricate design. However, Paley—and Darwin after him—marvelled at
how, in practice, nature abounds with exquisite adaptation that seems to
border upon perfection.
In recognition of the distinction between purposefulness and perfection,
it is useful to separate adaptationism into weak versus strong forms [4].
Table 1. Darwinism is the only scientiﬁc (i.e. predictive) theory of the
purpose of adaptation.
Darwinism intelligent design, etc.
process natural selection divine intervention, etc.
purpose maximize ﬁtness ?
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apparent design and purpose, on account of the action of
natural selection. Weak adaptationism makes no commit-
ment to the idea of perfection, and recognizes that multiple
forces in addition to natural selection—such as spontaneous
mutation and random drift—contribute to the evolutionary
process in an often deleterious way. By contrast, strong adap-
tationism is a caricature of Darwinism in which organisms
are regarded as entirely optimal in their form and their be-
haviour. As a scientific hypothesis, strong adaptation is
trivially falsified by empirical observation.
Yet, strong adaptationism is the central conceit of a hugely
successful programme of scientific research, based upon optim-
ization theory [5]. Practitioners of the optimization approach
consider what organisms would be like if they were optimally
fitted to the particular circumstances and challenges of their
environment, and thereby derive predictions that although
acknowledged to be only approximate are nevertheless, in
practice, often useful ones. Indeed, when there is a marked dis-
crepancy between prediction and empirical observation, this
usually means that a key aspect of the organism’s biology
has not been properly understood and remains to be incorpor-
ated into the optimization model. Accordingly, by an iterative
process of model adjustment, testable prediction and empirical
test, the optimization approach provides an investigative tool
by which scientists learn how the biological world works.
The optimization approach is made possible only because
Darwinism yields such a clear prediction as to what biologi-
cal adaptation is actually for. Without knowing what
organisms are designed to do, it would be impossible to
decide which of a range of possible phenotypes represents
the optimum. This point clarifies why typical critiques of
the adaptationist research programme are misguided: the
perennial complaint that adaptationists fail to consider
‘other hypotheses’—for instance, that organisms may be to
some degree maladapted [6]—mistakes adaptationism for a
hypothesis when it is actually a research method. The mala-
daptation view is strictly correct but also completely useless
if it does not yield specific, testable predictions. And it is det-
rimental to scientific progress if it obstructs the application of
the successful adaptationist approach (cf. [7]).2. The population genetics of purpose
The formal basis for evolutionary theory is the domain of
theoretical population genetics. Accordingly, it is proper
that Darwin’s theory of the purpose of adaptation be
framed in genetical terms. This was accomplished by
Ronald Fisher [8,9], with what he termed the ‘fundamental
theorem of natural selection’ (box 1). Fisher’s theorem pro-
vides a formal foundation for the view that natural
selection leads organisms to maximize their fitness—in the
sense that it will appear as if this is their purpose, rather
than in the sense that they will necessarily perfectly realizethis goal—and he rightly regarded it as taking centre stage
in his masterpiece The genetical theory of natural selection [8].
But it has had a turbulent history.
Fisher’s clearest verbal statement of the fundamental
theorem is: the increase of average fitness of the population ascrib-
able to natural selection is equal to the genetic variance of fitness1
[9]. The salient point here is that, as variances are non-
negative, there is a fundamental directionality to the action
of natural selection, always pointing in the direction of increased
fitness. That is, Fisher’s theorem describes the optimizing quality
of natural selection.
Despite Fisher’s clear focus on the immediate action of
natural selection, the fundamental theorem has long been
interpreted as a statement about the total change in the popu-
lation’s fitness from one generation to the next. The idea that
this would always increase was at first uncritically accepted
and then, decades later, suddenly rejected when simple
mathematical models revealed that population fitness is
capable of decreasing from generation to generation [13].
This led to a widely held view that the fundamental theorem
is not generally correct and—more damagingly—that any
notion of fitness maximization, or of there being a clear
purpose to Darwinian adaptation, is embarrassingly naive.
With regard to its correctness, George Price’s [14] careful
exposition of Fisher’s derivation established that the fundamen-
tal theorem is indeed mathematically sound (box 1). Price
clarified that the fundamental theorem concerns only the part
of change in average fitness across the individuals in the popu-
lation that is due to the action of natural selection per se and not
to other, non-Darwinian changes that Fisher [8] referred to col-
lectively as deterioration of the environment. Figure 1 provides an
illustration of which parts of the evolutionary change in aver-
age fitness are ascribed by Fisher to the action of natural
selection versus environmental deterioration.
Price admitted to being disappointed that this partial
result ‘does not say more’—presumably feeling that a descrip-
tion of the entirety of evolutionary change in population
fitness would be preferable. However, it is precisely because
the fundamental theorem is a partial result that it is so impor-
tant [15]. In isolating the part of the evolutionary process
responsible for adaptation—that is, natural selection—the fun-
damental theorem illuminates what is being adapted (the
individual) and for what purpose (maximizing her fitness).
Those individuals who achieve higher fitness are those
whose heritable constitutions will predominate in future gen-
erations, and accordingly it is these individuals who point out
the direction of the population’s evolutionary future.
For example, in the scenario depicted in figure 1, individ-
uals vary in their level of selfishness, with relatively selfish
individuals having relatively higher fitness and relatively
selfless individuals having relatively lower fitness, in com-
parison with their peers. Accordingly, the fitness-
maximizing quality of natural selection leads to an increase
in selfishness—as this is what directly increases the individ-
ual’s fitness. (A secondary consequence is that all
genotypes suffer reduced fitness on account of their carriers’
social partners now having a greater tendency to behave self-
ishly, and this deterioration in the social environment results
in a net decrease in average fitness.) That is, the idea that indi-
viduals strive to maximize their fitness correctly predicts the
direction of evolutionary change.
It is not clear why a mathematical account of the total
change in population fitness would be of much interest
Box 1. Fundamental theorem of natural selection.
Price’s equation—In very general terms, evolutionary change can be expressed as a sum of selection and transmission
components. This is captured by Price’s [10,11] equation, based upon a general mapping between two populations of
entities. Typically, one of these populations is descended from the other, and they are denoted ’parents’ and ’offspring’,
respectively.
To derive Price’s equation, assign every individual in the parent population a unique index i [ I and assign indices to
every individual in the offspring population according to which parent individual they are descended from. When a
given individual in the offspring population has more than one ancestor in the parent population (as in a sexual population),
each ancestor is awarded its genetic share of the offspring. Denote the relative abundance of the ith parent as qi, whereP
I qi ¼ 1. Typically, qi ¼ 1/N, where N is the number of individuals in the parent population. Similarly, denote the relative
abundance of the ith parent’s descendants in the offspring population as qi0. This allows a definition of the relative fitness of
any individual in the parent population as wi ¼ qi0/qi. Finally, assign each individual in the parent population a value zi for
any character of interest, and denote the average character value of their offspring as zi0 ¼ ziþ Dzi. The average character
value over the parent and offspring populations is E(z) ¼PI qi zi and E(z0) ¼
P
I qi0 zi0, respectively. Hence, the change in
the population average value of the character of interest is DE(z) ¼ E(z0) 2 E(z), which may be re-written as:
DEðzÞ ¼ covðw, zÞ þ EðwDzÞ, ðB1:1Þ
where: cov denotes a covariance and E an expectation, each taken over the set of all individuals in the population. The covari-
ance term describes the change ascribed to the statistical association between an individual’s character and its relative fitness,
and defines selection. The expectation term describes the change ascribed to character differences between a parent and her
offspring, and defines changes associated with transmission.
Natural selection is a particular type of selection that involves genes, the fundamental units of heredity. Here, the char-
acter of interest is not an individual’s phenotype per se, but rather her (additive) genetic value for any phenotypic character of
interest, i.e. the heritable portion of her phenotype [10,12]. Moreover, change is defined across a single generation. Denoting
the genetic value by gi, the action of natural selection is given by
DNSEðgÞ ¼ covðw, gÞ: ðB1:2Þ
That is, the change in the average value of the heritable character ascribed to the action of natural selection is equal to the
statistical covariance of that character and relative fitness, across all the individuals in the population. Importantly, equation
(B 1.2) describes the action of natural selection only, and not the entirety of evolutionary change.
Without loss of generality, this may be re-written as
DNSEðgÞ ¼ bðw, gÞvarðgÞ, ðB1:3Þ
where var(g) is the heritable variance in the character of interest and b(w, g) ¼ cov(w, g)/var(g) is the least-squares linear
regression of relative fitness against the heritable character. This form of Price’s equation highlights the basic Darwinian
logic that natural selection will act to drive change in the heritable constitution of the population (DNSE(g)= 0) if and
only if there is heritable variation (var(g) . 0) in a character that is associated with individual fitness (b(w, g)= 0).
Fundamental theorem—If the character of interest is taken to be fitness itself, then this may be decomposed into its gen-
etical and environmental components, w ¼ g þ e. It follows that b(w, g) ¼ 1, and substituting this into equation (B 1.3)
obtains:
DNSEðgÞ ¼ varðgÞ: ðB1:4Þ
That is, the increase in average fitness ascribed to natural selection is equal to the genetic variance in fitness.
rsfs.royalsocietypublishing.org
Interface
Focus
7:20170005
3
 on August 22, 2017http://rsfs.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from anyway. The relationship between population composition
and population fitness does not point out the direction of
the future. For example, in the above scenario, a population
in which selflessness predominates enjoys greater fitness, but
evolutionary change proceeds in the exact opposite direction:
increased selfishness. This recovers the population geneticists’
discovery that population fitness is not maximized [13], and
makes clear that what they had rejected was not—as they
had supposed—the idea that fitness is maximized, but rather
the idea that adaptation works ‘for the good of the species’.
3. The purpose of social adaptation
The personal-fitness-maximization design principle emerging
from Fisher’s fundamental theorem is not a fully generalresult. It may fail when social interactions occur between gen-
etic relatives. The application of the fundamental theorem to
social evolution serves to underline how Fisher intended the
theorem to be understood and yields deeper insights into the
purpose of adaptation.
In the absence of social interaction between genetic rela-
tives—including, for example, the model of selfishness
presented above—any correlation between an individual’s
genotype and her fitness may be taken to reflect a direct,
causal relationship2 (figure 2a). That is, if an individual’s heri-
table constitution is associated with higher fitness, this is
because it actually increases her fitness. Accordingly, on
account of natural selection favouring those traits that are
associated with higher fitness, individuals will appear
designed to maximize their fitness.
individual level of selfishness
natural
selection
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average
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Figure 1. Change in average fitness ascribed to natural selection versus deterioration of the environment. In this example, each individual achieves a higher fitness if
she behaves selfishly. Natural selection favours the fittest—i.e. most selfish—individuals, and the direct effect of this is to increase average fitness. However, the
consequent deterioration of the social environment—owing to an increased average level of selfishness—leads individuals of all genotypes to have reduced fitness.
The net effect is that average fitness decreases from one generation to the next.
–C
–C
r r
–C
+B
+B
(b) personal fitness (social)(a) personal fitness (non-social) (c) inclusive fitness (social)
Figure 2. Personal fitness and inclusive fitness. (a) In the absence of social interaction between genetic relatives, the correlation between an individual’s genotype
and her personal fitness reflects the direct causal impact of her genotype on her personal fitness (2C ). (b) In the context of social interaction between genetic
relatives, the correlation between an individual’s genotype and her personal fitness reflects the direct causal impact of her genotype on her personal fitness (2C )
plus the correlation between her genotype and her social partner’s genotype (r) multiplied by the causal impact of her social partner’s genotype on her own
personal fitness (þB). (c) In the context of social interaction between genetic relatives, the correlation between an individual’s genotype and her inclusive fitness
reflects the direct causal impact of her genotype on her personal fitness (2C ) plus the causal impact of her genotype on her social partner’s personal fitness (þB)
multiplied by the relatedness valuation (r) she places upon her social partner’s fitness.
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lation between an individual’s genotype and her fitness
may instead be due to her genotype being correlated with
that of her social partner, and her social partner’s geno-
type modulating her own fitness (figure 2b). That is, an
individual’s heritable constitution might be associated
with higher fitness—and hence favoured by natural selec-
tion—even if it actually directly decreases her fitness.
Accordingly, natural selection need not lead the individual
to appear designed to maximize her personal fitness.
To be clear, social interaction between genetic relatives
does not invalidate the fundamental theorem (the increase
of average fitness of the population ascribable to natural
selection is equal to the genetic variance of fitness, irrespec-
tive of social interaction between relatives; box 1). It merely
prevents the fitness-maximization design interpretation
from being drawn. So it is revealing that Fisher felt itnecessary to assume the absence of social interaction between
genetic relatives3 in his prelude to the fundamental theorem.
That Fisher made this assumption indicates that he, too,
drew the fitness-maximization design interpretation from
his theorem.
Does this correlation–causation difficulty mean that
natural selection is not responsible for organismal design
in the context of social interaction between genetic relatives?
Fortunately, this is not the case. The fundamental theorem
may be reformulated using an alternative fitness
measure—inclusive fitness—which is defined by subtracting
from the individual’s personal fitness all fitness effects due
to the actions of her social partners, and adding all the fitness
effects experienced by the focal individual’s social partners
as a consequence of her own actions, each increment or
decrement being weighted by the focal individual’s genetic
relatedness to the corresponding recipient (box 2; figure 2c;
Box 2. Kin selection and inclusive fitness.
Kin selection—On the assumption that there is heritable variation in a focal character (var(g) . 0) then, from box 1 equation
(B 1.3), natural selection will act to increase the average value of this character (DNSE(g) . 0) if and only if the character is
positively associated with individual fitness (b(w, g) . 0). There are two ways for a heritable character to be associated
with greater personal fitness: first, the character may directly improve the individual’s fitness (direct fitness benefit); and,
second, the character may be present among the individual’s social partners, such that its expression increases the individ-
ual’s fitness (indirect fitness benefit). Using the mathematics of multiple least-squares regression, this may be expressed as:
bðw, gÞ ¼ bðw, g j g0Þ þ bðw, g0 j gÞbðg0, gÞ, ðB2:1Þ
where b(w, g j g0) ¼ 2C is the effect of the individual’s own heritable character g upon her own fitness w, holding fixed the
heritable character of her social partner g0; b(w, g0 j g) ¼ B is the effect of the individual’s social partner’s heritable character g0
upon her own fitness w, holding fixed her own heritable character g; and b(g0, g) ¼ r is the statistical association between
these social partners’ heritable characters (i.e. the kin-selection coefficient of genetic relatedness; [18]). For simplicity, equation
(B 2.1) assumes that the focal individual has only a single social partner, but the approach readily extends to scenarios in
which the focal individual has multiple social partners.
Accordingly, the condition for natural selection to favour an increase in the average value of the heritable character
(b(w, g). 0) is 2C þ Br . 0, i.e. Hamilton’s [19] rule of kin selection, expressed here in its personal fitness (or ‘neigh-
bour-modulated fitness’) form.
Inclusive fitness—Noting that the statistical aggregate impact of social partners on the fitness of individuals within a
population is identical to the statistical aggregate impact of individuals upon their social partners in that population (i.e.
b(w, g0 j g) ¼ b(w0, g j g0), where w0 denotes the relative fitness of an individual’s social partner), the kin selection partition
of natural selection into its direct and indirect components may alternatively be expressed in its inclusive fitness form:
bðw, gÞ ¼ bðw, g j g0Þ þ bðw0, g j g0Þbðg0, gÞ: ðB2:2Þ
With some algebra, the action of natural selection can be expressed as:
DNSEðgÞ ¼ covðh, gÞ ¼ bðh, gÞvarðgÞ, ðB2:3Þ
where h ¼ b(w, g j g0)g þ b(w0, g j g0)b(g0, g)g is the focal individual’s inclusive fitness, i.e. the sum of her heritable character’s
impact on her personal fitness and also on the personal fitness of her social partner, the latter being weighted by the degree of
genetic relatedness between the two parties [19].
Fundamental theorem—If the character of interest is taken to be inclusive fitness itself, then this may be decomposed into its
genetical and environmental components, h ¼ g þ e. It follows that b(h, g) ¼ 1, and substituting this into equation (B 2.3)
obtains
DNSEðgÞ ¼ varðgÞ: ðB2:4Þ
That is, the increase in average inclusive fitness ascribed to natural selection is equal to the genetic variance in inclusive
fitness (cf. [20]).
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expressed as: the change in average inclusive fitness ascribed to
the action of natural selection is equal to the genetic variance in
inclusive fitness (box 2; cf. [20]).
By virtue of its definition, inclusive fitness is under the
individual’s full control, such that the correlation between
an individual’s genotype and her inclusive fitness reflects a
direct causal relationship. Accordingly, as a consequence of
the action of natural selection the individual appears
designed to maximize her inclusive fitness.
Though Darwinian adaptation is conventionally viewed
as occurring at the level of the individual organism, recent
years have seen growing interest in the idea that whole
social groups may be viewed as ‘superorganisms’ in their
own right, wielding their own adaptations for their own
purposes. In some cases, this is simply a return to
the woolly thinking of the first half of the twentieth
century, when many biologists unreflectively regarded
natural selection as always working for the good of the
group or species. However, in other cases, there is a legiti-
mate recognition that—on rare, but important, occasions—groups of socially interacting individuals have undergone
a major transition in individuality, such as the transition
from unicellular to multicellular life, and from cooperative
breeding to eusociality [21,22].
The fundamental theorem approach may be brought to
bear on this question of group-level adaptation. Specifically,
the action of natural selection may be decomposed into the
component operating at the within-group level and the com-
ponent operating at the between-group level, and in taking
group fitness itself to be the character of focal interest a fun-
damental theorem of multi-level selection emerges that states:
the change in average group fitness owing to the action of natural
selection is equal to the genetic variance in group fitness if and
only if there is no selection within groups (box 3; [24]). This
result clarifies why certain animal groups—like the Portu-
guese man-of-war, a jellyfish-like colony of clonally related
zooids, within which there is essentially no genetic variation
and hence no scope for within-colony selection—can be con-
sidered adapted superorganisms in their own right, but most
animal groups—within which there is scope for conflict as
well as collaboration—cannot.
Box 3. Fundamental theorem of multi-level selection.
Multi-level selection—In a group-structured population, the action of natural selection may alternatively be separated into its
between-group and within-group components:
DNSEJðgjÞ ¼ covJðwj, gjÞ þ EJðcovKðwjk, g jkÞÞ, ðB3:1Þ
where I have assigned every group a unique index j [ J; and, within a given group, I have assigned every individual a
unique index k[ K. The first term on the r.h.s. defines between-group selection and the second term on the r.h.s. defines
within-group selection [11,23].
Fundamental theorem—If the character of interest is taken to be group fitness itself, then this may be decomposed into its gen-
etical and environmental components, wj¼ gjþ ej. It follows that bJ(wj, gj) ¼ 1, and hence covJ(wj, gj) ¼ bJ(wj, gj)
varJ(gj) ¼ varJ(gj), and substituting this into equation (B 3.1) obtains
DNSEJðgjÞ ¼ varJðgjÞ iff EJðcovKðwjk, g jkÞÞ ¼ 0: ðB3:2Þ
That is, the increase in average group fitness ascribed to natural selection is equal to the genetic variance in group fitness
if and only if within-group selection is absent [24].
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Explaining the purpose of adaptation is a central achievement
of Darwinism. Being able to predict what it is that organisms
are striving to achieve not only sets Darwinism apart from
intelligent design and other forms of mysticism, but also sets
the hugely successful adaptationist research programme
apart from scientifically sterile anti-adaptationist thinking
within evolutionary biology. Getting to grips with the purpose
of adaptation is especially important in the context of social
evolution, where different biological agents are expected to
have different, conflicting purposes, and where naive notions
of group-level adaptation are liable to be strongly misleading.
Happily, there is a maturing body of formal theory that equips
the evolutionary biologist with the tools required to navigate
these issues and to break new Darwinian ground.
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